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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AFTON S. SEEGMILLER, ) 
Plaintiff-A ppellarnt, 
-vs.-
WESTERN MEN, INC., 
A California Corporation, 1 
WESTERN GIRL, INC., 
A California Corporation, and 
EDWARD HOOPES, 





NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff filed an action against the defendant 
corporations claiming that the franchise agreements be-
tween said corporations and the Plaintiff had been im-
properly terminated asking the court to reinstate such 
agrecmeuh; and award Plaintiff damages. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After trial of the issues, the District Court, Judge 
Stewart M. Hanson, entered its Findings of Fact and 
1 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment, and tlwrein deter-
mined that the contracts had been properly terminateLl, 
and that such terminations were effedin• and final 011 
.March 1, 1967. 
During the trial, the parties made accountings in 
relation to the operation of the franchise agreements, 
and the Court entered a judgment for certain sums held 
in reserve and required an accounting hy the Defendants. 
The defendant corporations complied with the Order of 
the Court, submitted an accounting, and paid the sums 
due thereunder to the Clerk of the Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to reverse the decision of the Dis-
trict Court and ca use such Court to make certain unspeci-
fied Findings of Fact which would allow a resulting Con-
clusion of Law to the effect that the contracts \\·ere im-
properly terminated and that the Appellant is entitled to 
general damages for breach of contract. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Afton Seegmiller, herein re-
ferred to as ''Appellant,'' has incorrectly stated or mis-
stated facts in several critical areas. 
Some of the statements contained in Appellant's 
Brief which are inconsistent with the facts or not sup-
ported by the records are as follows: 
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A. Although the record is replete with instances 
of defalcations by the Appellant and instances 
whl'rc' the Defendants have complained to Appellant 
i11 relation to her conduct, (Tr. 179, 180, 280, 315, 
:317) the Appellant on page 3 of her Brief incorrectly 
8latt's that the Appellant operated both franchises 
without incident until December 26, 1966, the date 
of termination. 
B. Although there is no evidence as to future 
or potential profit in the record, the Appellant stat-
ed on page 4 of the Brief that Appellant stood in 
good position to earn good profits. 
C. The Appellant, without supporting evidence, 
011 pagr 5 of its Brief sets forth certain conclusions 
as though they were facts. For example, the Ap-
pellant concludes that the Court's Order of January 
17, 1967, (R. 56, 57) effectively destroyed Appel-
lant's ability to operate under her contracts. The 
OrclN referred to specifically allows Appellant to 
operate under the contracts, and the statement of 
the Appellant is a conclusion of Appellant and not 
facts. 
D. On page 3 of Appellant's Brief, the Appel-
"'1-ng:fl.T£ Ftkr7 
lant again sets forth an - - as though 
~'iiPPoRJ;,EV e y 
it were • tacts when it is stated that, " ... It was 
because of the G.S.A. contract that the Plaintiff 
obtained the Western ~fen franchise agreement .... " 
E. Although the franchise contracts do not con-
tain production schedull's or requirements, other 
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than the general directive to develop the husine8R 
and business reputation, the Appellant on page 5 of 
her Brief states she expanded the business to a 
greater degree than required by the contracts. Since 
there was no specific confracrt requirement this 
creates a false impression. 
In order to clearly present the facts in chronological 
order, they are restated, eliminating conclusions of law 
and matters not supported by the record. 
The Respondents Western Girl, Inc., and \Vestern 
J'vlen, Inc., are California corporations, qualified to do 
business in the State of Utah, and engaged in the busi-
ness of providing temporary employees to customers 
with fluctuating employment requirements. 
On March 20, 1964, Appellant entered into a con-
tract with Defendant, Western Girl, Inc., to provide girls 
for temporary employment in a territory described as 
the Wasatch Front (R. 18, 24). 
On the 31st day of March, 1965, Appellant entered 
into a contract with Defendant, Western Men, Inc., to 
provide men for temporary employment for various 
clients in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 25, 28). 
On September 13, 1966, the Defendant, Western :Meu, 
Inc., entered into a contract with the General Servicl!s 
Administration, hereinafter referred to as "G.S.A." to 
furnish the United States Government with temporary 
male personnel required at Clearfield, Utah (R. 37, 3:5). 
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Paragraph I (i) of the agreement between Appellant 
ancl Y.l es tern Men, Inc., provides as follows: 
'' ... We will attempt to obtain government work 
and work from companies having offices in more 
than one city for your agency whenever pos-
sible .... " (R. 25). 
Defendant, Western Men, Inc., requested Appellant 
to se1Tice the G.S.A. contract and supply needed per-
sonnel (R. 15, 16). 
v\lith relation to the Western Girl, Inc., franchise 
contract, the Appellant defaulted in the performance of 
the agency contract in the following particulars: 
A. Appellant failed to develop the name and 
business of Western Girl, Inc., as required by the 
provisions of paragraph 2a. of the agreement (Tr. 
262, 263). 
B. The Appellant failed to equip and maintain 
an office properly identified as a Western Girl office 
in violation of paragraph 2b. of the agreement (Tr. 
169, 270) (Exhibits D 36, 37, 38). 
C. The Appellant failed to follow the recom-
mendations requiring signs on the offices and doors 
and windows as required under paragraph 2c. of the 
frauehise agreement (R. 25, 28) (Tr. 166, 270). 
D. The Appellant failed to provide advertis_ing 
and promotional material as required by paragraph 
2c. of the agreement (R. 25, 28) (Tr. 281, 282). 
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With relation to the \Vestern Men, Inc., francliiR 0 
contract, the Appellant defaulted in the performance of 
the agency contract in the following particulars: 
A. In violation of paragraph 2a. of the agree-
ment, the Appellant failed to develop the name and 
business of Western Men, Inc. (Tr. 262, 160, 263). 
B. In violation of paragraph 2b. the Appellant 
failed to maintain and properly identify the office, 
and such office was maintained at an unsuitable lo-
cation (Tr. 166). 
C. In violation of paragraph 2d. of the agree-
ment, the Appellant failed to transmit employee's 
tiffie cards in accordance with schedules (Tr. 305) 
(Tr. 162, 178). 
D. Appellant failed to properly service the 
G.S.A. contract and supply the needed personnel 
(Tr. 315, 316). 
On October 12, 1966, the Defendant, \Vestern 1\Icn, 
Inc., received a notice from the G.S.A. indicating the 
failure to properly service and perform the contract and 
the Government's intention to terminate the same 
(R. 30). 
The Appellant was advised of default and franchise 
problems in several telephone calls on and after October 
12, 1966 (Tr. 146, 190). 
The Appellant maintained offices at six locations 
(Tr. 166), and the location of the office at the time of 
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till· t(•rmination of the contract was a residence at 4141 
South 7th East, Salt Lake City, Utah (Tr. 169); sec i1ho-
t 1 ( l1~xhihit D 35, D 36, D 37, D 38). There was no ideu-
l ifica iio11 of the office as a ·western 1\Ien - ·western Girl 
J•;rnployme11t Office, except a phone listing ( 'rr. 270). 
Appellant for ::;ome extended period of time had not 
been readily available during office hours, and it was ex-
tremely difficult for the San Francisco office of the De-
f euclants to contact Appellant (Tr. 184, 185). 
Defendants furnished oral notice of termination of 
the t\rn agency contracts on December 26, 1966 (Tr. 
8, 11). 
Defendants furnished Appellant ·with formal notice 
of termination of the two ageucy contracts on December 
:lO, 19GG (R. 32, Tr. 32, and Exhibit P 22). 
Appellant filed a Complaint and obtained a Tempo-
r:uy Order restraining the Defendant, Wes tern Men, 
Ine., from interf eriug with the franchise agreement and 
sc1Tici11g tlrn contract between ·western Men, Inc. and 
the G.S.A. (R. 9). 
After heariug on the Order to Show Cause, the Court 
morlified the Restraining Order continuing the restraint 
on clrfeudants as to interference with the Appellant's 
opl'ra ti on of the ·western Men, Inc., franchise agree-
nwHt, hut allowing the Defendant, \Vestern Men, Inc., 
1 o perform the duties required of it by its contract with 
tl10 General Services Administration (R. 56, 57). 
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After various hearings and pretrial proccclures, the 
cause came on regularly for hearing and was tried, and 
the Court entered its Memorandum Decision and it8 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE ADEQUATE-
LY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The Appellant makes no claim that evidence prof-
fered by him was improperly excluded, but to the con-
trary, claims that the Court erred in judging the veracity 
of the witnesses and in sorting the evidentiary wheat 
from chaff. 
This Court has many times affirmed the doctrine that 
it will not substitute its interpretation of the evidence 
for that of the trier of the facts. 
It should be noted that both points relied on by 
Appellant for reversal relate not to the application of 
the law to the facts, but claim that the facts found by 
the trier of facts are not to the liking of the Plaintiff. 
This cause was tried by the Court and the Court was 
extremely liberal in allowing the Plaintiff to intro-
duce questionable evidence (Tr. 5, 17, 18, 44, 219). 
An indicated by Justice Wolfe in the landmark de-
cision of In Re Hanson's Estate, the Supreme Court will 
not second-guess the Trial Court on evidentiary matters: 
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'' ... We cannot disturb the findings if there is 
any competent evidence to support them. More-
over, since the case was tried to the Court and 
i10t to a jury, we must presume that the Court 
ignored incompetent evidence in making a find-
ing, if there is any substantial competent evidence 
to support it. There cannot be any objection to 
('Onclusions of fact in findings if there is any com-
petent evidence to support the conclusions .... '' 
In Re Hanson's Estate, 87 Utah 58, 52 P.2d, 1103. 
The findings of the Lower Court are abundantly sup-
ported by the record. 
Findings 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9 are routine uncontested 
findings arising by way of admissions or exhibits re-
ceind in evidence without contest. 
Finding No. 5 relates to Appellant's defaults in the 
performance of the Western Girl, Inc., agency agreement 
and is supported by the evidence (Tr. 169, 270). 
Finding No. 8 in essence finds that there is no con-
fusion of terms, inconsistency of terms or ambiguity in 
the contracts and therefore the written documents con-
tain the total obligations of the parties. This is a finding 
of ultimate fact from all evidence adduced by the parties. 
Finding No. 10 results logically in that the Western 
~Ten contract was by its terms not exclusive and restrict-
ed to Salt Lake City, and provided for the franchisee to 
f>e1Tice National accounts (R. 25). 
Fi11ding No. 11 relates to Appellant's defaults in the 
p<>rformance of the \Vestern l\f en, Inc., agency agree-
9 
meut and is supported b~T the evidence (R. ;)O, Tr. HG 
I 
190, P22). 
Finding No. 12 is a restatement by the Court of the 
existence of certain court orders and their effect 
Finding No. 13 results from the fact that no evi-
dence of a conspiracy was adduced. 
Since each :finding of the trial court is supported by 
substantial competent evidence, the findings of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE WESTERN MEN CONTRACT MAY BE 
TERMINATED WITHOUT CAUSE IN AC-
CORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE 
AGREEMENT. 
The Western Men agency contract contains the follow-
ing provision with respect to termination: 
'' 5. In the event you wish to terminate this con-
tract, you agree to give us at least sixty clays no-
tice in writing. In the event we wish to termi-
nate, we will likewise give you sixty days notice 
in writing. During said period you shall co11fornc 
to maintain complete operations unless arrange-
ments are made between us for earlier termina-
tion.'' (R. 25, 28.) 
Most jurisdictions have held that where an agency 
contract contains a provision allowing termination with-
out restriction, a party may cancel the contract without 
being subjected to a claim for hrcach of contract. (Sec 
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:~Am .• Jur. 2d, Agency, Sec. 47, 32 A.L.R. 212, G2 A.L.R. 
il47, 80 ,\.L.R. ~· 254.) 
''A principal may rightfully revoke an agency 
where such act is in accord with the parties agree-
ment. He may, also, reserve the right to revoke 
the agency contract when in his judgment the con-
<luct of the agent is unsatisfactory .... " (2 C.J.S., 
Agency§ 74.) 
Iu the instant case the conduct of the Appellant in 
com1ection with her servicing of the Government con-
tract was such that she placed the Defendant, Western 
:\le11, Inc., in a position of jeopardy with the General 
SerYices Administration and the Defendant, \Vestern 
Men, foe., had no alternatiYe but to exercise its right of 
termi1wti<Jll as provided in the agreement. 
Although the \Vestern :Men agency agreement was 
]Jy its terms restricted in geographical area to Salt Lake 
City, Utah, the Defendant nevertheless did not service 
the Go\·ernmcnt contract ( G.S.A.) at Clearfield, Utah, 
until after the entry of a judgment authorizing it to so 
clo (Amended Order, R. 56, 57). The Defendant, vVest-
<.•rn :\Ien, Inc., operated pursuant to said Order and the 
Appcllnnt clicl not appeal from or contest such Order. 
In the instant case, the contract between Western 
:JI en, Inc., and Appellant had an explicit provision au-
thorizing termination witha sixty days written notice 
without ca use. This provision for termination had equal 
application if Appellant had desired to terminate. 
Although no reason for termination is required, it 
should he noted that the record is replete with cause for 
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termination (Tr. 305, 306). It should also be noted that 
\Vestern Men, Inc., was required to terminate the ar-
rangement whereby Appellant serviced the G.S.A. con-
tract or subject itself to substantial damages resulting 
from the termination of its contract by the Government 
(R. 15, 16). 
The election to terminate the contract was made by 
Respondent because Respondent's business was in jeop-
ardy and there is no evidence that the election was madr 
for any malicious or devious reason. 
Appellant cites two cases to support its contention 
that the \V" estern Men agency contract could uot be ter-
minated except for cause. In the case of Watkins"· Rirl1, 
254 Mich. 82, 235 NW 845, the facts were that the Def end-
ant craftily manipulated Plaintiff i11to a contract for the 
purpose of obtaining additional security and upon ob-
taining such security and within one month cancelled 
the contract. This case is clearly distinguishable from 
the present case for in the present case there is no evi-
dence of fraud in the inducement to the contract or that 
the cancellation arose by reason of fraudulent intent. The 
plain fact is that the Appellant failed to develop busi-
ness and that she operated both agency contracts at a 
loss (Tr. 262, 263). 
The case of Moon Motor Car of New York v. Moon 
JI otor Car Co., 29 F.2d 3 is clearly distinguishable from 
the present situation, for in that case the agency con-
tract was terminable only upon violation of conditions 
('Ontained in the agreement. 
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a 
A correct analysis of the principle set forth in the 
1V at kins v. Rich case, Supra, is contained in the case of 
Martin v. Ford Motor Company, D.D. Mich. 93 F. Supp. 
920, 1950. This case involves a contract similar to the 
Western Men contract providing for termination by 
eitlier party with sixty days' notice. The Court distin-
guished the Watkins v. Rich case and held: 
''The agreement in this case was not for a fixed 
period of time, but was terminable at any time at 
defendant's will upon compliance with the re-
quirement as to notice. It is beyond the power of 
the judiciary to engraft conditions upon the exer-
cise of such contractual right.'' 
A later Michigan case, Busam Motor Sales v. Ford 
Jlotor Cornpany, 203 :B-,.2tl 469, 1933, involving a dealer-
ship contract terminable at the will of either party with 
written notice, also discussed Watkins v. Rich and ana-
lyzctl the problems contained therein at length. The 
Court concluded the Watkins case stands for the prin-
eiple that if a manufacturer lacked good faith at the 
inception of the agency agreement then the termina-
tion provision would be no defense to the agent's action 
to recover damages resulting from cancellations of the 
agreement. 
As indicated by the above causes and authorities, 
the termination of a contract in accordance with its pro-
visions is not subject to question as to motive) reason 
or intent unless at the time of creation of the contract 
there was bad faith or fraud in the inducement. 
The District Court's Conclusion of Law No. 1 is 
well founded in law and should be sustained. 
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POINT Ill 
THE WESTERN GIRL CONTRACT IS TER-
J\IINABLE FOR SUFFICIENT CAUSE AND 
SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR TERMINATION 
vVAS SHOWN. 
With respect to termination, the Western Girl con-
tract provides as follows: 
"6. In the event you ·wish to terminate this 
agreement for a just arnl reasonable cause, you 
agree to give us at least sixty days notice in 
writi11g. In the event we wish to terminate for 
just and reasonable cause, we 'Sill like·wise gin 
you sixty days notice in ·writing. During said pe-
riod you shall continue to maintain complete op-
erations unless arrangements are made between 
us for earlier termination." (R 23.) 
It is clear that an agency contract may 11e caneeller1 
for default or inability to perform on the part of the 
agent or contracting party. (See 3 Am. J ur 2c1 agency, 
§ 48, 32 A.L.R. 221, 52 A.L.R. 548, 89 A.L.R. 257, 17 
C.J.S. Contracts, ~ 399). 
The principk•s are also re-emphasized in the Re-
statement of Agency: 
''A principal is privileged to discharge before 
the time fixe<l by contract of employment an agent 
who has committed such a violation of duty that 
his conclnct constitntes a material breach of 
contract.'' 
''An unexcused failure to substantially perform 
the work which he has contractcrl to do, or serious 
violation of duty of loyalty or o hec1ience, consti-
tute a breach of the entire contract.'' (Restate-
ment of Agency 2cl edition ~ 409.) 
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Defendant's, Western Girl, Inc., right to cancel de-
pends on proving only that there was fair and honest 
rrason for termination (R. 23, Paragraph 6). 
Appellant by her contract was required to develop 
the uame and business of vVestern Girl, Inc. (R. 20 Par-
agraph 2a.) and to equip and maintain a properly identi-
fied and suitable office (R. 20, Paragraph 2b). 
The Appellant failed to develop business and in fact 
consistently operated the Western Girl franchise at a 
loss (Tr. 262, 263). The Appellant operated from var-
ious unsuitable business locations (Exhibits 35, 36, 37, 
38) (Tr. 169) and failed to advertise and properly iden-
tify her offices (Tr. 166). 
The District Court after trial made proper findings 
aml as iudicated in Point I of this brief these findings are 
supported by the evidence and should be sustained. 
The case of Erskin v. Chei·rolet Motor Company, 117 
SE 706, 158 NC 479, cited by the Appellant is not ap-
plicahle to the case at hand for the Erskin case involved 
an oral agency agreement and there were specific find-
ings of fraud and reliance on fraudulent representations. 
These elements are neither pleaded nor invoked in the 
rnse at bar. 
'l1he Appellant further relies on the Terre Haute 
Brewing Company case, 102 F.2d, 425 (CCAS) which 
l'ase is also not in point for in the Terre Haute case an 
oral agency agreement was involved and the extent of 
the term was at issue. In the present case a written 
15 
contract is involved and the Lo,ver Court found that 
the defendant failed to perform her written agreements. 
The record discloses no claim of fraud or fraudulent 
representations. 
As indicated under Point I the findings of the trial 
court should be sustained. 
The District Court's conclusion of Law No. 2 stat-
ing that the contract was terminable for cause and was 
so terminated, is well founded in the facts and funua-
mental contract law and should be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
SINCE DEFENDANTS DID NOT BREACH 
THEIR CONTRACTS, APPELLANT IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO DAMAGES. 
Appellant charges that Defendant, \V es tern :Men, 
Inc., breached the Western Men contract by replacing 
the Appellant as operator of the G.S.A. contract prior 
to terminating the Wes tern .'.\Ien contract. It is to be not-
ed that the franchise holder of the "Western Men con-
tract is restricted to the Salt Lake City area. The con-
tracting parties to the G.S.A. contract are the General 
Services Administration on one hand, and Wes tern l\1en, 
Inc., on the other hand. 
As indicated by the findings of the District Court in 
the hearing on issuance of the restraining order, the 
\Vestern l\Ien contract was restricted to Salt Lake City, 
Utah (R. 57, Paragraph 3), (Contract R. 27, Paragraph 
16 
2g.). The G.S.A. contract was serviced by Appellant at 
Clearfield, Utah, as a separate venture and required 
tlifferent payment rates (R. 37, 53). 
The Defendant, Western Men, Inc., was required by 
the United States Government to correct servicing in-
adequacy under the G.S.A. contract and elected to re-
place Appellant as the servicing agent of such contract 
and notified Appellant of this intention. The Appellant 
in anticipation of the Defendant's termination notice 
filed an action and asked for a restraining order (R. 1, 
4). A temporary restraining order was issued (R. 9). 
Appellant was not replaced as servicing agent until after 
a hearing 011 the temporary restraining order and the 
District Court by specific order allowed the Defendant, 
\Vestern Men, Inc., to ser;ice its contract with the Unit-
ed States of America General Services Administration 
(R. 1, Paragraph 2). A contrary ruling would have re-
sulted in the Court ordering the Defendant to breach or 
continue to violate its contract with the Government. 
Defendant's, Western Men, Inc., conduct which was 
strictly in accordance with the orders of the Court could 
l1ardly be considered a breach of the contract. If Ap-
pellant had desired to contest this Court Order it could 
have filed bond to stay the effect of the Order and ap-
pealed to this Court for a review of the District Court 
Order. 
Hfl V2- 8Efl\) • 
lt would .. ludicrous for the Court to require the 
DPfendant Western Men Inc., to refrain from servicing 
' ' 
a eoutract between itself and the Government and cor-
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rectillg ddaults in said contract when such a ru]j 11 ,, 
would have exposed "\Vestern 1\Te11, Inc., to the suhstm~ 
tial damages provided by such contract urnler conditions 
where it Yrnnld haw· no recourse against the Appcllmn 
for such damages. 
The Appellant has not shown any breach of the writ-
te>n contract by the Defendants and as stated bv thiR . ' 
Court on many occasions, the intention of the partieR 
and the meaning of the contract will he adduced from 
the contract, and ·where the terms are plain, the l'Ontract 
is conclusi\·e. Jensen's Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah 2d 
;)70, 353 P.2d 259. 
There is no claimed c011fusio11 of contract terms arnl 
if the Court follows its rule of interpretation as set forth 
in Plaiu City Irrigation v. IT oover: 
"The beginning point of interpretation of n 
contract has been saicl to be au rxamination of thr 
language used." Plain City lrrigation Company\'. 
Ilooper, 11 Utah 2d, 188, 356 P.2cl 62S. 
then the District Court's conclusions nncl contract inter-
pretations must be sustained. 
-Western 1\fon, Inc., operated only in conformity with 
its contract with the Unitecl States of Am0ricn and tlw 
Orders of the Third .J uclicinl District Court, thereforr, 
such action could not he considered as a breach of the 
Defendant's contract with Appelhrnt and Appellant't> 
/IV f' t contentions in this regard are not fournlecldaw or ac · 
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CONCLUSION 
The case at Bar is fundamentally simple. Two con-
trnds are before the Court. One contract could be ter-
minated by either party by giving specified notice. The 
Trial Court found that adequate notice was given. The 
other contract could be terminated only for cause and 
nftcr specified notice. The Trial Court determined that 
there was cause and adequate notice was given. 
Siuce the findings of the District Court are adequate-
ly supported by the testimony and record, the judgment 
of the trier of the facts should be sustained. 
No ambiguities can be found in the portions of the 
contract invoked in the case and therefore there is no 
justification for changing the terms and conditions there-
of or modifying the decision of the District Court. 
The decision of the District Court should be affirmed. 
Of Counsel 
Respectfully submitted, 
IRVING H. BIELE 
ROY G. HASLAM 
117 East Fourth South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Responden.fs 
BIEL]~, JONES & MURPHY 
J 17 ~~ast Fourth South Street 
8alt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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